Evidentiary Issues in Sexual Harassment Litigation by Krieger, Linda Hamilton





For many years, the efforts of feminist litigators to protect women
from sexual harassment in the workplace focused on convincing courts
that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination actionable under
state and federal anti-discrimination laws. Following widespread judicial
acceptance of this contention in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however,
the focus of sexual harassment litigation began to change from the viabil-
ity of plaintiff's cause of action to issues regarding burdens of proof,
appropriate discovery limitations, and the admissibility of various types
of evidence.
In the past three years, two issues of particular significance in sexual
harassment cases have attracted the attention of state and federal courts.
The first is whether a sexual harassment defendant can inquire into the
prior sexual conduct of a harassment plaintiff in the same way that crimi-
nal defense lawyers probed the sexual histories of rape victims before the
widespread reform of rape laws in the 1970s.1 The second issue is
whether and, if so, for what purposes, a sexual harassment plaintiff can
discover and introduce evidence regarding her harasser's conduct toward
other female employees.
The purpose of this Article is to examine recent developments in
these two areas and to provide guidance to litigators who, without the
benefit of substantial judicial precedent, are confronted with these issues.
The Article will conclude that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the
sexual history of a harassment plaintiff is neither discoverable nor admis-
sible at trial, because in most cases there is no evidentiary theory under
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which it is relevant to any claim or defense. On the other hand, the
harasser's conduct toward other female employees or customers is, in a
number of situations, directly relevant to establishing the essential ele-
ments of a sexual harassment cause of action. In these cases, a plaintiff is
entitled to discover and introduce evidence of this nature.
I. DEFENDANT'S ATTEMPTS TO DISCOVER OR INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE OF A PLAINTIFF'S SEXUAL HISTORY
With seemingly increasing frequency in sexual harassment litiga-
tion, defendants are attempting to discover and introduce evidence relat-
ing to the plaintiff's past sexual conduct as part of their defense strategy.
A defendant may attempt to use evidence of a plaintiff's sexual history to
support a contention that the plaintiff is a "promiscuous" woman and
that, consistent with this trait, she solicited the defendant's advances or
was herself the sexual aggressor in the situation.2 The defendant may
also seek evidence of past sexual conduct hoping to show that, in light of
her past behavior, it is unlikely that the plaintiff was offended or emo-
tionally disturbed by the defendant's conduct.' Or the defendant may
wish to use evidence of past sexual conduct to attack the plaintiff's credi-
bility as a witness.
As patently unreasonable as these contentions may seem to those
with feminist sensibilities, their potential effectiveness should never be
underestimated. There exists in this society a powerful mythology that a
woman who has been subjected to sexual violence has probably brought
it on herself, either because she solicited it, or because she was "that sort
of woman," and was consequently "fair game." 4 It is because of this
mythology that the consent defense has been used so effectively in rape
cases, and that a rape trial can be as brutalizing and humiliating for the
victim as the rape itself.'
2 See Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
3 See Department of Fair Empl. & Housing v. Fresno Hilton Hotel, California Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Case No. FEP80-81C7-0514se, Precedential Decision No. 84-03 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as F.E.H.C. Dec. No. 84-03]. Copies of the Commission's precedential deci-
sions are available from its office, and are reprinted in CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION
OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION PRECEDENTIAL
DECISIONS.
4 For a thorough discussion of the nature and effects of this mythology, see S. BROWNMILLER,
AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975). For an overview of the impact the
mythology has had on sexual harassment jurisprudence, especially in the early sexual harass-
ment cases, see C. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
5 In 1978, Congress amended the Federal Rules of Evidence by enacting the Privacy Protection
for Rape Victims Act, now FED. R. EVID. 412, which excludes evidence regarding the rape
victim's past sexual behavior in all but an extremely narrow range of circumstances. In sup-
port of the bill, Representative Holtzman made the following statement on the House floor:
Too often in this country victims of rape are humiliated and harassed when they
report and prosecute the rape. Bullied and cross-examined about their prior sexual
experiences, many find the trial almost as degrading as the rape itself. Since rape trials
become inquisitions into the victim's morality, not trials of the defendant's innocence
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The sexual harassment defendant who seeks to discover or admit
evidence of the plaintiff's sexual history may be doing so not only in an
attempt to play upon the trier of fact's prejudices, but also to make the
litigation so uncomfortable for the plaintiff that she is willing to abandon
it or settle for a fraction of its potential value. It is therefore imperative
that the plaintiff's attorney be prepared to protect the plaintiff from
improper discovery and admission of evidence about her past sexual
behavior. Although this issue confronts practitioners throughout the
United States, there are only two published decisions treating it, both
originating in California. Nonetheless, these two decisions, Priest v.
Rotary6 and Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Fresno Hilton
Hotel,7 can provide substantial assistance to attorneys across the country.
The evidentiary principles upon which these cases were based are virtu-
ally uniform in American jurisprudence.
The purpose of the following section is to provide the practitioner
with evidentiary background necessary for a cogent, non-ideological
analysis of the sexual history issue as it may arise during the course of
litigation. Additionally, it will examine in light of established evidentiary
principles, the various evidentiary theories used by defendants to support
the discovery or admission of evidence of sexual history.
A. Overview of the Principles Governing the Discovery and
Admissibility of Evidence
The sexual harassment plaintiff's attorney must structure her argu-
ment differently depending on whether she is attempting to prohibit the
discovery of evidence regarding the plaintiff's sexual history, or to exclude
evidence at trial. Her arguments must differ because the standards gov-
erning the discoverability of evidence are different from those governing
its ultimate admissibility.
Under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, information
is discoverable if it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. 8 Consequently, a party who seeks to prevent her
opponent from discovering information must demonstrate either that
there is no evidentiary theory under which the evidence could be admissi-
ble, or that any potential relevance the evidence could have is outweighed
by the annoyance, embarrassment or oppression its discovery would
or guilt, it is not surprising that it is the least reported crime. It is estimated that as few
as one in ten incidents of rape is ever reported.
H.R. 4727, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978).
6 98 F.R.D. 755 (1983).
7 F.E.H.C. Dec. No. 84-03, supra note 4.
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
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inflict upon the plaintiff.9 Thus, to succeed in protecting the plaintiff,
counsel must have a thorough understanding of every possible eviden-
tiary theory on which the defendant might base the potential relevancy of
the evidence and be able to demonstrate how and why each is invalid.
Whether a particular piece of evidence is relevant will depend on the
purpose or purposes for which it is offered. Thus, the same piece of
information may be deemed relevant or irrelevant depending on the
attorney's ability or inability to articulate a proper evidentiary theory
supporting its admission.
The importance of these principles is graphically illustrated when a
party seeks to introduce evidence of a person's character by testimony
regarding either her reputation or her past acts. Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, testimony regarding a person's character or prior behavior
is not admissible for the purpose of proving that on a particular occasion
she acted in conformity with that character trait or past behavior.'0
However, such evidence may be admissible if it is offered for some other
purpose," or if the character of the plaintiff is "in issue" in the litigation.
The term "in issue," as it is used in this context, has a limited meaning.
A given fact is deemed to be "in issue" in a case only if that fact consti-
tutes an essential element of a claim or defense. i2
A plaintiff's reputation for promiscuity or sexual aggressiveness is
9 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also Hughes & Anderson, Discovery: A Competition Between the
Right to Privacy and the Right to Know, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 289 (1971).
10 FED. R. EvID. 404(a) provides in pertinent part: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity there-
with on a particular occasion .... "
FED. R. EvID. 404(b) provides in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
The Rule 404(b) exceptions, listed above, may be used by a defendant in his attempt to
articulate a legitimate evidentiary theory to support the admissibility of evidence of the plain-
tiff's past sexual behavior. See Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, at 759-61; see also infra text
accompanying notes 22-33.
I See supra note 10.
12 FED. R. EvID. 405(b) provides: "In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person
is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific
instances of his conduct."
Proof of specific instances of conduct may be made under FED. R. EVID. 405(b) only in
those rare cases in which character is in and of itself an essential element of a claim or defense,
but not when it is being used circumstantially to infer an act which constitutes the essential
element. U.S. v. Donoho, 575 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S.
811 (1979); United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978); 22 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5267 (1969); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note I, at 1 405[05]; D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 150 (1977).
Cases in which character or a trait of character is an essential element of a claim or
defense are extremely rare. The Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 405 gives only
two examples: the chastity of a victim under a statute specifying her chastity as an essential
element of the crime of seduction; and the competency of a driver in an action for negligent
entrustment of a motor vehicle to an incompetent driver. In each of these cases, the character
trait in question is not being used inferentially. It is, in and of itself, an ultimate fact which
under the substantive law determines the rights and liabilities of the parties. It is this ultimate,
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not an essential element of a defense in a sexual harassment case.
Defenses ordinarily take one of two forms; each may stand alone or be
used in combination with the other. First, the defendant may argue that
he did not commit the acts complained of. Secondly, the defendant may
concede that the plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action,
but argue that the action was taken for non-discriminatory reasons.
13
However, when a plaintiff includes a claim for compensatory damages
based on an allegation that the defendant's conduct had a damaging
effect on her interest in sexual activity, then her sexuality is put "in
issue." In such a case, a defendant would most likely be permitted to
inquire into the plaintiff's past and present sexual behavior.
Consequently, the potential admissibility and hence the discovera-
bility of evidence regarding the plaintiff's sexual history will turn on the
purpose articulated by the defendant for its being sought or offered. The
remainder of this section will examine various evidentiary theories which
a sexual harassment defendant might advance and will discuss the extent
to which they may or may not be valid.
B. Evidence of the Plaintiff's Sexual History to Prove
That She Solicited the Defendant's Advances
or Was the Sexual Aggressor
More often than one might think, a sexual harassment defendant's
attorney will state, either during a plaintiff's deposition or in a brief sup-
porting a motion to compel deposition testimony, that the defendant
seeks evidence of the plaintiff's past sexual conduct to prove that she had
a tendency to be promiscuous or sexually aggressive,' 4 and that she acted
in conformity with that tendency in her dealings with the alleged har-
asser. Evidence regarding the plaintiff's past sexual behavior is unques-
tionably inadmissible for this purpose.' 5
rather than inferential, nature of the fact that makes it an essential element of the claim. See J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra, at $ 401[03].
13 Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
14 In Priest v. Rotary, defense counsel, when asked during Ms. Priest's deposition for an explana-
tion of the potential relevancy of her sexual history, made the following statement: "Now,
certainly this lady's sexual history is certainly [sic] relevant to the subject matter of this law-
suit, and it's certainly reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery or evidence that may be
relevant to that issue showing habit, custom, and propensity to engage in such conduct." 2
Deposition Transcript of Evelyn J. Priest at 3, Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755.
Subsequently, in his brief supporting a motion to compel Ms. Priest's testimony, defense
counsel articulated the following evidentiary theory to support its relevancy, again ignoring
the proscriptions of FED. R. EvID. 404(b):
In order to corroborate Mr. Rotary's position that the plaintiff was the sexual aggressor
in this case, the defendant in deposing EVELYN PRIEST sought information from her
to establish a pattern of conduct indicating that she had acted in a sexually aggressive
manner on other occasions in order to receive benefits relating to her personal welfare.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Compel
Answers Upon Oral Deposition at 4-5, Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755.
15 See supra text accompanying notes 10 and 12. That a defendant would articulate such an offer
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Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of a party's prior
acts is not admissible to support an inference that the party acted in con-
formity with those past acts on a particular occasion. 6 The leading case
applying this principle to rape litigation was United States v. Kasto,'7 and
in Priest v. Rotary,'" it was extended to sexual harassment litigation.
Once a sexual harassment defendant realizes that he has walked into
the wall presented by Rule 404(b), he may, like the defendant in Priest v.
Rotary, search for a different evidentiary theory to support the admissi-
bility of the past-acts evidence. However, upon examination, these theo-
ries prove to be no more valid than the one just discussed.
C. Past Acts Evidence as Constituting Proof of Habit
In Priest v. Rotary, the defendant attempted to justify his attempts to
discover the plaintiff's past sexual conduct by asserting that it would con-
stitute evidence of "habit," which is admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 406.19 The district court noted that the distinction between
character and habit evidence can at times be elusive, but not when one is
attempting to characterize a person's past sexual conduct. 20 Quite cor-
rectly, the Priest court found the habit theory to be without merit.21
It is well-established that for past acts evidence to rise to the stature
of "habit" evidence admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 406, the
evidence must reveal a consistent response to a specific situation which
occurs with virtually invariable regularity.22  The "semi-automatic,"
of proof in the face of Rule 404's clear prohibitions demonstrates the strength of the non-
conscious ideology that a woman who does not conform to traditional expectations regarding
her sexual conduct cannot be heard to object to sexual advances of aggression by men in
whom she has no sexual interest.
16 See 10 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 404.02
(1982).
17 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
18 98 F.R.D. at 758.
19 Id. Specifically, in Priest, the defendant contended that he was seeking to discover the identity
of each person with whom the plaintiff had been sexually involved for the past ten years in
order to show that she had a "habit" of seducing men so that she could move into their
residences and avoid having to pay rent. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Defendant's Motion to Compel Answers Upon Oral Deposition at 7, Priest v. Rotary, 98
F.R.D. 755.
20 98 F.R.D. at 758-59.
21 Id.
22 Professor Wigmore summarized the task of distinguishing habit evidence from evidence of
character in the following commentary:
There is, however, much room for difference of opinion in concrete cases owing chiefly
to the indefiniteness of the notion of habit or custom. If we conceive it as involving an
invariable regularity of action, there can be no doubt that this fixed sequence of acts
tends strongly to show the occurrence of a given instance. But in the ordinary affairs of
life a habit or custom seldom has such an invariable regularity. Hence, it is easy to see
why in a given instance something that may be loosely called habit or custom should be
rejected, because it may not in fact have sufficient regularity to make it probable that it
would be carried out in every instance or in most instances.
IA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 92 at 1608-09 (Tillers rev. 1983).
For a further discussion of the distinction between character and habit evidence, see
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"non-volitional" or "reflexive" nature of habitual behavior is the quality
which renders the evidence trustworthy and distinguishes it from charac-
ter evidence.23
It is difficult to imagine how an individual's prior sexual conduct
could be described as "reflexive," "non-volitional," "semi-automatic" or
occurring with "invariable regularity." This is especially true if a defend-
ant, like the defendant in Priest, is attempting to demonstrate that the
plaintiff undertook a series of conniving schemes to seduce her prior sex-
ual partners and her alleged harasser. The volitional, planned nature of
such conduct would defeat any attempt to characterize it as "habit"
evidence.24
It has already been established in the context of rape litigation that
merely couching evidence indicating an unchaste character in terms of
"habit" does not render that evidence admissible if it is not technically
habit evidence. 25 A sexual harassment defendant's attempt to character-
ize evidence of a plaintiff's sexual history as evidence of habit is nothing
more than an effort to circumvent Rule 404(b)'s exclusion of past acts
evidence to support an inference of subsequent consistent behavior.
D. Use of Past Acts Evidence to Prove Motive or Intent
A sexual harassment defendant may also take the position that evi-
dence of the plaintiff's past sexual relationships is relevant to prove
"motive" or "plan," and is thus admissible under the Rule 404(b) excep-
tions.26 This "motive" theory can take a number of forms. In Priest v.
Rotary, the defendant contended that evidence of the plaintiff's sexual
history would demonstrate that she possessed a "motive" or "plan" to
seduce her alleged harasser for economic gain, and that, when she failed
in her plan, she undertook a plan to retaliate against him by filing her
sexual harassment case.
As the district court noted in Priest, the defendant's first theory was
nothing more than an attempt to discover evidence of past acts to prove a
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 195 (2d ed. 1972) discussed in Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. at
758.
23 United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228 (10th
Cir. 1971); CFW Constr. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1966). See also C.
CHAMBERLAYNE, MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 3204 at 4433, cited in Priest v. Rotary, 98
F.R.D. at 759.
24 In rejecting the defendant's "habit" theory, the Priest court relied on the D.C. Circuit's lead-
ing decision in United States v. Levin, 338 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1964). In Levin, the court
refused to characterize as habit the defendant's lifelong practice of remaining at home on the
Sabbath, noting that the very volitional basis of the activity raises serious questions as to its
invariable nature, and hence its probative value. 338 F.2d at 272. As the Priest court
observed, if a person's lifelong religious practices cannot properly be characterized as habit,
neither can a person's history of sexual relationships. 98 F.R.D. at 759.
25 Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 47 (4th Cir. 1981).
26 See supra note 10 for the text of FED. R. EViD. 404(b) and a discussion of the exceptions.
27 98 F.R.D. at 760.
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propensity to act in a certain manner, an attempt which Rule 404(b)
clearly prohibits. 28 As for the defendant's "motive to retaliate" theory,
the Priest court refused to accept the idea that the plaintiff's prior sexual
conduct would have any bearing on whether or not she intended to retali-
ate against the defendant by suing him for sexual harassment.29
An attempt to use a motive or intent theory to establish the rele-
vancy of sexual history evidence in a sexual harassment case is invalid for
a second reason. Under Rule 404(b), prior acts may be admitted to show
motive, other than motive to falsify evidence or bring false charges, only
in cases where motive or intent is "in issue" between the parties, that is
to say, where intent or motive is an essential element of a claim or
defense.3a Plaintiff's intent or motive is not an element of a defense to an
action for sexual harassment under Title VII,31 and thus cannot serve as
the basis for the admissibility of past-acts evidence under Rule 404(b).
Additionally, if the party opposing the admission of the past acts
evidence claims that he did not engage in the conduct alleged by the
party seeking its admission, the evidence is not admissible to prove
motive or intent. The motive and intent exceptions to Rule 404(b) are
intended to apply only to situations where a party admits the doing of an
act but claims that he or she did it innocently or mistakenly.32 Conse-
quently, if a defendant seeks to prove that the plaintiff had a "motive" to
proposition him, and the plaintiff contends that she did not proposition
him, Rule 404(b)'s intent exception will not apply.
33
28 Id.
29 It should be noted that in certain limited circumstances, evidence proving that a party had a
sexual relationship with a specific individual may be relevant in proving an ulterior motive in
instituting litigation. In United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, the court noted that in rape
cases, where evidence proving an ulterior motive surrounding the charge of rape incidentally
required the admission of evidence showing a prior sexual relationship, such evidence would
be allowed. Id. at 271 n.2. To illustrate this proposition, the Kasto court cited the Texas case
of Shoemaker v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 518, 126 S.W. 887 (1910). In Shoemaker, a rape defend-
ant sought to prove that the alleged victim had been having sexual relations with a man by the
name of Tom Baynum. The proferred evidence was also to demonstrate that when confronted
about this relationship by her morally outraged sisters, the alleged victim told them that if
they made her move out of the house, as they threatened, she would charge one of the sister's
husband, the defendant, with rape. 58 Tex. Crim. at 521, 126 S.W. at 888-89. Thus, the
"motive" involved in Shoemaker was a motive to charge the defendant falsely, not a "motive"
or, more properly stated, a "propensity" to engage in consensual sexual relations with him.
The latter is what the defendant in Priest v. Rotary was attempting to demonstrate.
30 United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Crockett, 514 F.2d
64, 72 (5th Cir. 1975); 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 401[03]
(1985).
31 The essential elements of such a defense are: first, that the defendant did not commit the acts
of sexual harassment alleged by the plaintiff; or second, that the plaintiff was subjected to the
adverse employment decision for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d at 953. See infra discussion accompanying notes 104-105,
32 United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d
1303, 1306; Garcia v. Aetna Fire Casualty & Ins. Co., 657 F.2d 652, 655 (5th Cir. 1981).
33 See discussion of United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, in Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. at 760-
61.
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E. Attempts to Discover or Introduce Evidence of Plaintiff's
Sexual History to Show an Alleged Lack of Sensitivity,
or an Oversensitivity, to Sexual Conduct
In cases in which the plaintiff has made a claim for compensatory
damages,34 or has alleged a violation of Title VII through the creation of
a hostile, offensive, or intimidating work environment,3" the defendant
may argue that evidence of her prior sexual conduct will show that she
was not likely to have been emotionally disturbed or injured by whatever
transpired between her and her alleged harasser. This contention was
advanced by the respondent and rejected by the California Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Commission in Department of Fair Employment &
Housing v. Fresno Hilton Hotel.36
In refusing to permit introduction of the evidence regarding the
complainant's sexual history, the Commission in Fresno Hilton relied
heavily on the Northern District of California's decision in Priest v.
Rotary.37 However, the Commission went further and noted that even if
it admitted evidence that the complainant had consensually engaged in
sexual horseplay with persons other than her alleged harasser and had a
number of former sexual partners, it would not follow from those facts
that the unwelcomed sexual advances of a different individual would not
offend her. As the Commission stated, to find otherwise, "we would have
to believe that the emotional responses of harassment victims are fungi-
ble and indistinguishable. Furthermore, we would have to accept the
absurd and deeply offensive notion that a woman's consensual conduct
with some individuals negates her right to say 'no' to the same or similar
conduct with others."
38
The California Commission's decision, reflected in the above lan-
guage, found support in the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Katz v. Dole.3 9
In Katz, the defendant offered evidence at trial that the plaintiff had
engaged in sexual banter with one of her male co-workers in an effort to
show that she had not really been offended by other employees' sexually
suggestive behavior. The Katz court, like the Commission in Fresno
Hilton, refused to accept that the latter proposition followed from the
former fact.
In other cases, the defendant may attempt to demonstrate that the
34 Compensatory damages are not available in actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The plaintiff in such an action is limited to equitable relief. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1452 n.153 (2d ed. 1983) and cases cited therein.
Compensatory and punitive damages are available, however, undeT some state anti-discrimina-
tion statutes including the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. Commodore Home
Sys. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 649 P.2d 912, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1982).
35 See infra text accompanying notes 73-85.
36 F.E.H.C. Dec. No. 84-03, supra note 4.
37 Id. at 21-22.
38 Id. at 23.
39 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
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plaintiff had an "oversensitivity" to sexual banter, or some psychological
condition that caused her to imagine that sexual advances were being
made when, in fact, they were not. The Northern District of Illinois
recently confronted such a defense strategy in Jennings v. D.HL. Air-
lines.4' In Jennings, the defendant attempted to discover the records of
the plaintiff's psychotherapist to demonstrate that the plaintiff's com-
plaint of sexual harassment resulted from her own emotional problems,
which caused her to be "oversensitive" to sexual conduct, and not from
any "real" harassment.
The district court refused to require the production of the records,
ruling instead that they were protected by the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.4 In so ruling, the court noted that the issue of whether the
employer had created a hostile, offensive and intimidating work environ-
ment42 is determined by applying an objective test; it does not depend on
the plaintiff's subjective state of mind.4"
The Jennings case is an extremely important tool in protecting sex-
ual harassment plaintiffs from psychological abuse during the course of
litigation. Jennings stands for the proposition that the focus of the evi-
dentiary inquiry in a hostile work environment case should be on the
defendant's conduct, not on the plaintiff's psychological predispositions.
If the plaintiff's state of mind is not relevant, it is correspondingly not
discoverable.
This proposition may hold, however, only if the plaintiff's complaint
does not include a prayer for damages to compensate for mental distress
caused by her exposure to the work environment. Jennings was brought
under Title VII, which does not provide a basis for an award of compen-
satory damages." The Jennings court specifically noted that if the plain-
tiff's complaint had included a claim for emotional distress damages, her
psychological well-being would have been in issue,"' and hence
discoverable.
There may, however, be circumstances in which, even where the
plaintiff's mental condition is put in issue by an emotional distress claim,
requiring her to submit to a psychological evaluation would be inappro-
priate. Numerous state discovery statutes and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 35 require a showing of good cause before such discov-
ery will be permitted, and lodge in the trial court the discretion to pro-
hibit the discovery even when the mental condition of the party is in issue
in the litigation.
Consequently, if the sexual harassment defendant has been guilty of
40 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1423 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
41 Id. at 1425.
42 See infra discussion accompanying notes 74-86.
43 Id.
44 See cases cited supra note 32.
45 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1425.
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prior discovery abuse in the litigation or has failed to demonstrate why
the discovery it seeks cannot be obtained by less intrusive means (or if the
motion has not been timely made), the plaintiff's counsel should consider
opposing the motion on the grounds that the burden and oppression
which the examination will occasion outweighs its potential value to the
opposing litigant.46
This situation was presented in Zabkowicz v. West Bend Company.47
In Zabkowicz, the plaintiffs, a married couple, alleged that they had suf-
fered extreme emotional distress as a result of the wife's having been sex-
ually harassed at work.4" The defendant sought an order requiring both
plaintiffs to submit to a psychiatric examination by the defendant's
expert witness in the absence of plaintiff's counsel or a recording device.
The Zabkowicz court refused to order the examination, and held that in
situations where a psychiatric evaluation of a sexual harassment plaintiff
is appropriate, the plaintiff is entitled to have a recording device, counsel,
or any other third party present at the examination.49
In cases where a sexual harassment plaintiff may properly be
required to submit to a psychological evaluation, plaintiff's counsel
should move for a protective order permitting herself to be present at the
examination, requiring that a tape recording of the examination be made,
and limiting the scope of the examination to the issue of whether the
harassment caused the plaintiff to suffer mental distress. Inquiry into the
plaintiff's sexual history or other aspects of her personal life should not
be permitted to show a propensity to act in a sexually aggressive or pro-
miscuous manner,50 to challenge her credibility,"' or to demonstrate that
the work environment itself did not violate Title VII or a similar state
46 As of the publication of this Article, the California Supreme Court is considering the case of
Vinson v. Superior Court, No. SF 24932 (review granted Sept. 19, 1985). In Vinson, the plain-
tiff is arguing, with substantial persuasiveness, that a psychological or physical examination of
a sexual harassment plaintiff by the defendant's experts should never be permitted, because in
the context of sexual harassment litigation it is inherently abusive and results in too great a
chilling of the plaintiff's entitlement to seek vindication of important civil rights. For further
information regarding the Vinson case, readers are encouraged to contact plaintiff's counsel,
Patricia Shiu, at the Employment Law Center in San Francisco, California.
47 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 209 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
48 It is curious that the issue regarding proof of emotional distress arose at all in Zabkowicz,
given that compensatory damages for mental suffering or emotional distress are not permitted
in cases under Title VII, which provides only for equitable relief. Shah v. Mount Zion Medi-
cal Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1981); DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 808 (1st
Cir. 1980); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir.
1976).
49 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 210.
5o See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
51 Under California law, expert testimony on the issue of credibility is not admissible at trial.
People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 195, 443 P.2d 794, 800, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 216 (1968), cert.
denied sub nom. Russel v. Craven, 393 U.S. 864 (1968); Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d
159, 173, 410 P.2d 838, 847, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 311 (1966); People v. Fleming, 140 Cal. App.
3d 540, 544, 189 Cal. Rptr. 619, 620 (1983). For a justification of this rule, see Juviler, Psychi-
atric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses" A Suggested Approach, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 648
(1960).
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statute. 52 Plaintiff's counsel should also ensure that the order permitting
a psychological evaluation specifies the conditions required by the appro-
priate state or federal discovery rule.53
F. The Use of Protective Orders in Sexual Harassment
Discovery Disputes
Under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,5" a court
may deny or limit a party's right to take discovery, even though the
information sought might be relevant in the litigation. Under the Rule,
the degree to which proposed discovery will aid in the search for truth
must be balanced against the burdens or dangers of abuse it would occa-
sion. 55 A protective order is appropriate when the discovery sought by a
party, or the manner in which the discovery is to be taken, would, in
comparison to any legitimate value it might have, unduly burden, embar-
rass, oppress, or annoy the party from whom it is sought.
5 6
Plaintiff's counsel should be prepared to use Rule 26(c), or its state
equivalent,57 to protect the sexual harassment plaintiff from a number of
potentially abusive discovery practices. As was done in Priest v.
Rotary,58 any attempt by the defendant to compel discovery relating to
the plaintiff's prior sexual conduct should be accompanied by a plaintiff's
motion for a protective order prohibiting such inquiries. Moving for a
protective order gives the plaintiff an opportunity to expound upon the
public policy considerations justifying a limitation on discovery, because
the motion is decided by balancing the value of the discovery against the
burden and oppression it would occasion; the plaintiff would get this
52 See supra discussion of Jennings v. D.H.L. Airlines in text accompanying notes 40-45.
53 For example, both CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2032 and FED. R. Civ. P. 35 require that any
order permitting a mental or physical examination specify the time, place, manner, conditions,
and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.
54 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) provides, infer alia:
Protective ordern Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery
is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alter-
natively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposi-
tion is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,
including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the
discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery
other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be
inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain letters; (5) that
discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6)
that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court ....
55 Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 588 F.2d 904, 908 (4th Cir. 1980); Carlson Cos. v. Sperry
Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1088 (D. Minn. 1974).
56 For a thorough discussion of the standards governing protective orders under FED. R. CIv. P.
26(c), see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2040 (1969).
For a discussion of the competing interests of privacy and full disclosure in litigation, see
Hughes & Anderson, supra note 9.
57 See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 2019(b)(1).
58 98 F.R.D. 755.
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opportunity even if the court considers the information sought to be of
marginal relevancy.
In Priest v. Rotary,59 these public policy considerations proved to be
highly persuasive to the district court. The Priest court noted that dis-
covery of the intimate aspects of plaintiffs' lives, as well as those of their
friends and acquaintances, would have a dangerous potential to discour-
age the prosecution of harassment cases, just as it once chilled the report-
ing and prosecution of rape.' The court also accepted the plaintiff's
contention that discovery of a party's past sexual conduct constitutes
such a serious invasion of her constitutionally protected right to privacy
that it should not be permitted unless justified by extraordinary
circumstances.6'
There are additional situations in which a Rule 26(c) order may help
protect the plaintiff from further harassment by the defendant in the
guise of legitimate discovery. For example, should the defendant bring
the accused harasser to the plaintiff's deposition, counsel might consider
the possibility of terminating the deposition and bringing a motion under
Rule 26(c)(5) to bar his attendance. As discussed above, a protective
order should certainly be sought should the defendant seek an order per-
mitting physical or mental examination of the plaintiff. A protective
order under Rule 26(c)(5) might also be obtained to place under seal any
information regarding the plaintiff's sexual history or mental condition
that is deemed discoverable by the court.
In almost all of these contexts, plaintiffs can draw upon the proce-
dural rules and substantive standards developed to protect rape victims
from abusive criminal defense practices. As the court in Priest v. Rotary
stated:
It is often said, that those who do not learn from history are condemned to
repeat it. By carefully examining our experience with rape prosecutions,
however, the courts and bar can avoid repeating in this new field of sexual
harassment suits the same mistakes that are now being corrected in the
civil rape context.
62
The need for conscientious and creative advocacy to protect sexual har-
assment plaintiffs from potential discovery abuse cannot be overempha-
59 Id.
60 Id. at 761.
61 Id. at 762. The Priest court referred in its opinion to Berger, Man's Trial. Woman's Tribula-
tion: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COL. L. REV. 1 (1977). As the author of that article
noted:
[Tihe practice being examined, introduction of sexual history, arguably impinges upon
the victim in ways that differ in kind and degree from the ordinary rigors of being a
witness. For many people (especially, in our society, women) the trauma of baring
one's intimate past to the eyes of the world-turning one's bedroom into a showcase-
overshadows the usual discomfort of testifying, or having others testify, to one's biases,
lies or even convictions of criminal acts.
Id. at 41.
62 98 F.R.D. at 762.
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sized, especially while the law is in its present formative stage of
development.*
II. EVIDENTIARY IssuES RELATING TO THE HARASSER'S
CONDUCT TOWARD OTHER EMPLOYEES
The investigation of a sexual harassment claim frequently reveals
information suggesting that the harrasser's conduct toward the plaintiff
was not an isolated event. The plaintiff herself, or her co-workers, will
often provide the plaintiff's attorney with reports of his offensive conduct
toward other female employees. When this occurs, and when a plaintiff
attempts to use this information in support of her claims, issues regard-
ing the discoverability or admissibility of the evidence will inevitably
arise, especially if the plaintiff is simultaneously resisting defense efforts
to discover or admit evidence relating to her past sexual behavior.
There are obvious reasons why a plaintiff may want to offer evidence
of the alleged harasser's conduct toward other female employees. The
cornerstone of virtually every sexual harassment defense is a frontal
attack on the plaintiff's credibility, 63 a strategy which, with disturbingly
frequent effectiveness, plays upon the notion that women imagine sexual
aggression and fabricate charges of sexual assault. 6" Alternatively, remi-
niscent of the provocation and consent theories which have for so long
characterized rape defenses, a sexual harassment defendant may contend
that the plaintiff invited his sexual advances or was herself the sexual
aggressor in the situation.6- Evidence showing that the alleged harasser
engaged in sexually suggestive or offensive conduct towards a number of
women, including the plaintiff, has an obvious ability to undermine this
defense theory.
However, when a plaintiff attempts to discover or admit evidence of
this sort, the defendant is likely to argue, with some facial appeal, that
evidence of his conduct toward employees other than the plaintiff is inad-
missible "propensity" or past acts evidence directly analogous to inad-
missible evidence of the plaintiff's past sexual conduct. Upon closer
analysis, however, it becomes clear that a number of evidentiary theories
support the admissibility of a sexual harasser's conduct toward female
employees other than the plaintiff, and that this evidence is not analogous
to evidence of the plaintiff's sexual history. This section will discuss the
evidentiary theories which support the admissibility of a harasser's con-
Since the writing of this Article, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1057 which, in
essence, codified the federal court's decision in Priest Y. Rotary. The bill added § 2036.1 to the
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE and §§ 783 and 1106 to the CAL. EVID. CODE. Additionally, the bill
amended §§ 11507.6 and 11513 of the CAL. Gov'T CODE.
63 See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934.
64 See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 4, at 250, 412, 415.
65 See Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. at 760.
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duct toward other employees and review the treatment this issue has
received in the sexual harassment cases.
A. Evidence Regarding the Harasser's Conduct Toward Other
Employees in the Early Sexual Harassment Cases
In the early 1970s, federal district courts were extremely resistant to
recognizing that sexual harassment was sex discrimination violating Title
VII. Despite the fact that all of the sexual harassment cases had involved
a male's sexual advances toward a female employee, many courts refused
to acknowledge the role that gender plays in sexual harassment.66 These
courts dismissed sexual harassment cases on the grounds that sexual
advances did not constitute sex discrimination.
In support of this view, these courts focused on what they perceived
to be the "personal" or "individual" nature of the harassment.6 They
reasoned that if sexual harassment was personal, it could not be directed
at a protected group per se; thus it was not "sex-based," as Title VII
68requires.
In response to these rulings, several plaintiffs alleged that other
female employees, in addition to themselves, had been sexually
harassed. 69 In these cases, plaintiffs convinced district courts to recog-
nize the harasser's conduct as a form of sex discrimination violating Title
VII. In contrast, in Miller v. Bank of America,70 where no such allega-
tions were made, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim citing
the absence of allegations of similar conduct by the harasser toward
other female employees.7
66 See. e.g., Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nor.
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Barnes v. Train, the district court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the defendant's conduct was not pro-
hibited by Title VII. The court stated, "The substance of plaintiff's complaint is that she was
discriminated against, not because she was a woman, but because she refused to engage in a
sexual affair with her supervisor. . . . [The supervisor's conduct] does not evidence an arbi-
trary barrier to continued employment based on plaintiff's sex." 13 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 124. See also Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556
(D.N.J. 1976) (plaintiff's gender was "incidental" to her claim of abuse), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044
(3d Cir. 1977).
67 In Barnes v. Train, the district court characterized the plaintiff's allegations of sexual harass-
ment as involving "a controversy underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmonious personal
relationship." 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 124. In Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F.
Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), the district court stated that the defendant's conduct "appears
to be nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism," and that rather than
discriminating against the plaintiff, he was merely "satisfying a personal urge."
68 See C. McKINNON, supra note 4, at 5.
69 Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 660 n.8 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd in part sub nor. Williams v.
Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
70 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
71 The Miller court characterized the plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment as an "isolated act"
of discrimination and distinguished it from the ultimately successful sexual harassment claim
in Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, which did include allegations of conduct toward other
female employees.
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Given that courts considered an allegation of offensive conduct
toward other female employees as essential to a valid sexual harassment
claim, they would have been hard-pressed to deem evidence supporting
that allegation to be irrelevant and inadmissible. Consequently, the early
sexual harassment decisions frequently contain references to evidence of
the alleged harasser's treatment of women employees other than the
plaintiff.72
A present day sexual harassment plaintiff, however, can no longer
rely on these cases to support her attempt to discover or admit evidence
of this sort. In 1977, two federal circuit courts held that sexual harass-
ment was "sex-based" discrimination which violated Title VII, even if the
plaintiff was the only female employee affected by the harasser's con-
duct. 73 These two reversals became a catalyst for a definitive change in
Title VII law, and it is now virtually undisputed that sexual harassment
is a form of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII. Courts no
longer view sexual harassment as "personal," and they no longer require
allegations of harassment toward other female employees. Thus,
although there is no opinion on point, it is reasonable to assume that
evidence of an alleged harasser's conduct toward other female employees
can no longer be admitted on the theory that it is an essential element of
the plaintiff's cause of action; a plaintiff must find other evidentiary theo-
ries if she expects to be permitted to discover or submit such evidence.
B. The Hostile, Intimidating and Offensive Work
Environment Theory
Since the Title VII cause of action for sexual harassment was recog-
nized in 1977, courts have come to distinguish between two broad cate-
gories of sexual harassment claims. The first, generally referred to as a
"job detriment" claim, involves a plaintiff who has lost some tangible job
benefit because of her unfavorable response to the harasser's sexually
suggestive conduct or requests for sexual favors. The job detriment
involved can include termination, demotion, failure to promote, denial of
a promised raise, or any other concrete aspect of employment. 74 In some
72 See, e.g., Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. at 662, and Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233
at 236.
73 Barnes v. Costle, 516 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'g Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d
Cir. 1977), rev'g 442 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976). The holdings in Barnes and Tomkins that
sexual harassment is sex discrimination are based on the courts' recognition that but for the
female gender of the plaintiff, she would not have been subjected to the conduct in question.
Put another way, sexual harassment is sex discrimination for the reason that the plaintiff
became the target of the offender's advances because she is a woman.
74 See. e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, in which the circuit court
deemed the defendant liable for demoting and eventually terminating the plaintiff due to her
refusal to comply with her male supervisor's sexual demands. The court stated: "[W]e con-
clude that Title VII is violated when a supervisor . . . makes sexual advances or demands
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cases, a plaintiff may allege that she suffered actionable job detriment
even though she in fact acquiesced to her supervisor's demands because
she was fearful of losing her job.75
The second category of claims challenges a work environment made
intolerable to the plaintiff by her male supervisor's or other male employ-
ees' persistent physical or verbal abuse. These are referred to as "hostile,
offensive and intimidating work environment" claims.76 The most signif-
icant difference between these two types of claims is that the work envi-
ronment claim does not entail the loss of any "concrete" or "tangible"
job benefit."'
Despite the fact that courts had already recognized both job detri-
ment and hostile work environment claims in race discrimination cases,
78
many were reluctant to do so in sexual harassment cases. 79 These courts
interpreted Title VII's provision prohibiting discrimination with respect
to "terms, conditions and privileges of employment" 80 as prohibiting
only sexual harassment which resulted in the loss of a tangible job bene-
fit. Sexual harassment which "merely" pervaded the work environment
was not considered to be a "term or condition" (one could hardly charac-
terize it as a "privilege") of one's employment."'
However, many courts had, since 1971, interpreted the "terms and
conditions" clause as protecting minority employees from expressions of
racism in the workplace.8 2 Thus, for nine years, courts recognized claims
toward a subordinate employee and conditions that employee's job status, evaluation, contin-
ued employment, promotion, or other aspects of career development---on a favorable response
to those advances or demands." Id. at 1048-49. See also Barnes v. Costle, 516 F.2d 983, and
Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., 552 F.2d 1032.
75 Eg., Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
rev'g 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.C.C. 1980).
76 For brevity's sake, these will be referred to simply as "work environment" claims for the
remainder of this Article. For a full explanation of what might constitute sexual harassment
in the work environment context, see C. MAcKINNON, supra note 4, at 40-47.
77 See, e.g., Robson v. Eva's Super Mkt., 538 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Ohio 1982). In Robson, the
plaintiff alleged that her male supervisor offered her a hundred dollars to "go to bed" with
him, continually directed profane and suggestive comments to her, stared at her body, patted
her buttocks and boasted of sexual conduct with her to other employees. The plaintiff also
alleged that her supervisor "penalized" her at work and that she eventually had to quit her
job. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and held that the plain-
tiff had alleged a factual basis for a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII.
78 Compare McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (job detriment claim) with
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) (work envi-
ronment claim).
79 See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1979); Clark v. World Airways, 24 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305 (D.D.C. 1980); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D.
Colo. 1978).
80 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982).
81 EFg., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d at 665, in which the court held that a cause of action under
Title VII requires "but-for" causation between an employee's refusal of demands and dis-
charge. See also Clark v. World Airways, 24 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305, in which the
court held that sexual harassment is actionable only when the employer retaliates for rebuffed
advances.
82 For example, in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972), the court stated:
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challenging racially discriminatory work environments, yet did not rec-
ognize claims challenging sexually harassing work environments.
This pattern began to change in 1980, when the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission issued its guidelines on sexual harassment in
the workplace, 3 which stated that the creation of a sexually harassing
work environment did constitute a violation of Title VII. The approach
taken in the EEOC guidelines was then adopted in 1981 by the District
of Columbia Circuit in the landmark case of Bundy v. Jackson,84 in
which the court, following Rogers v. EEOC, 5 held that sexual harass-
ment constituted sex discrimination violating Title VII even if it did not
result in tangible job detriment to the plaintiff. Swayed by the EEOC
guidelines and the Bundy decision, most courts now recognize the hostile
work environment claim.86
A sexual harassment plaintiff whose complaint includes a hostile,
offensive and intimidating work environment claim will be permitted to
introduce evidence regarding the harasser's conduct toward other female
employees for the simple reason that this conduct is an essential element
of the plaintiff's cause of action. The essential elements of a hostile work
environment claim are set out in the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Hen-
son v. City of Dundee.87 To prove the fourth element of the prima facie
case-that the harasser's conduct affected the plaintiff's terms and condi-
[E]mployee's psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily entitled to pro-
tection from employer abuse, ... the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" in Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective
ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or
racial discrimination.
454 F.2d at 238; see also Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F.Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). But see Cariddi v. Kansas
City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977). While the court acknowledged
that derogatory comments could be so opprobrious as to constitute a Title VII violation, it
nevertheless affirmed the trial court finding that the "casual" ethnic slurs used did not raise a
Title VII claim.
83 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)-(g) (1985). The regulations state in pertinent part:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title Vi1. Unwel-
come sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when . . . (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.
Id. § 1604.11 (a) (citation omitted).
84 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
85 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
86 See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251
(4th Cir. 1983); Robson v. Eva's Super Mkt., 538 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Ohio 1982); Morgan v.
Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1981); Hayden v. Cox Enter., 28 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1315 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Caldwell v. Hodgeman, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1647 (Mass.
Dist. Ct., Quincy Div. 1981).
87 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). The Henson court lists the following elements as constituting
the plaintiff's primafacie case: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a class protected under Title VII; (2)
the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of
was based on sex; and (4) the harassment complained of affected a "term, condition or privi-
lege" of employment. 682 F.2d at 903-04.
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tions of employment-the plaintiff must show that the harassment was
"sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and
create an abusive working environment.""8 Whether the harassment is
sufficiently severe and persistent to seriously affect the plaintiff's psycho-
logical well-being is to be determined in light of the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" of the case.89 Thus to prove the fourth element of a hostile
work environment claim, a plaintiff may introduce evidence of the
alleged harasser's conduct toward other female employees of which she
was aware and which created a hostile, offensive or intimidating work-
place for the plaintiff. 9
To utilize the hostile work environment theory to support the
admission of evidence regarding the harasser's conduct toward other
female employees, a plaintiff must first lay the necessary legal ground-
work by including an allegation about the creation of such an environ-
ment in her complaint. It is also critical that the plaintiff who wishes to
rely on this theory prove not only that the harasser engaged in the con-
duct in question, but furthermore that, at some point during her employ-
ment, she became aware of that conduct and was psychologically affected
by it.
Under the hostile work environment theory, evidence of a harasser's
conduct toward other female employees is relevant to show that it cre-
ated a psychologically damaging work atmosphere for the plaintiff.
Obviously, a plaintiff could have been affected by such conduct only if
she was aware of it. If evidence of her awareness is lacking, a trial judge
may properly conclude that the only purpose for the evidence is an
attempt to show that the alleged harasser had a propensity to harass
female employees. If this is the case, the evidence is inadmissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Consequently, at trial, it is important
to elicit testimony from the plaintiff as to how she became aware of the
instances of the harasser's conduct toward other female employees; and it
is advisable to get her testimony into the record before those employees
testify to the conduct themselves. 9'
88 Id. at 904.
89 Id; see also EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harrassment in the Workplace, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.1 l(b) (1985) ("In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment,
the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances").
90 Using evidence of the alleged harasser's conduct towards other female employees in this way is
distinguishable from using it to support an inference that the defendant was more likely to
have harassed the plaintiff if he harassed other female employees. While it is improper to offer
past acts evidence as inferential proof of an alleged wrongdoer's propensity to act in a certain
manner, this is not the purpose for which the evidence is being offered in a hostile work
environment case. The evidence is offered as direct proof of an essential element of the plain-
tiff's case in chief, and as such, is admissible. Compare FED. R. EvID. 404(b) with J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, at 401[04].
91 For example, assume that the plaintiff's attorney wishes to offer the testimony of a female co-
worker that the alleged harasser sexually propositioned her. To lay the proper foundation for
this testimony under the hostile work environment theory, the plaintiff must be able to testify
that she either witnessed, or was told about, the incident. If the plaintiff was told about the
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If the plaintiff learned after she left her employment that other
female employees had also been harassed by the defendant, she will not
be able to rely on the work environment theory to support the admissibil-
ity of evidence relating to these incidents. Similarly, the theory cannot be
used to support the admission of evidence relating to the alleged har-
asser's conduct outside the workplace. For his conduct actually to affect
a plaintiff's work environment, that conduct must have been directed
toward female employees or other women, such as customers, in the
workplace itself.92
The hostile work environment claim provides, in some cases, one
additional basis for the discoverability and admissibility of evidence
regarding the harasser's conduct toward female employees other than the
plaintiff. When a sexual harassment plaintiff has been harassed by an
individual other than the actual owner of the company by which she is
employed, she will generally be attempting to hold the company itself,
not merely the individual harasser, liable for the Title VII violation
under the theory of respondeat superior.9"
In a job detriment case, courts hold the employer strictly liable for
the discriminatory actions of the supervising or managing employees
who took the adverse action against the plaintiff.94 However, in a hostile
work environment case, unless the individual creating the hostile envi-
ronment was the actual owner of the business, the plaintiff must, as part
of her prima facie case, establish that the employer knew or should have
known that the hostile environment was being created and failed to take
proper remedial action.95
A hostile work environment plaintiff can demonstrate that the
employer should have known of the creation of such an environment by
showing that the harassment was so pervasive that it could not have
escaped the attention of a reasonably responsible employer. She may also
incident, her testimony to that effect will undoubtedly draw a hearsay objection from the
defendant's attorney.
However, the plaintiffs testimony that "so-and-so" told her of the incident is not hearsay.
The statement of an out-of-court declarant constitutes hearsay only if it is offered for the truth
of the facts stated. This testimony would not be offered for that purpose, but for the purpose
of demonstrating the plaintiffs awareness of an incident and her resulting state of mind.
92 It should be noted that in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, the court held that the defendant
created a hostile and offensive work environment for the Hispanic plaintiff by the defendant
employer's conduct toward its Hispanic clients.
93 As a matter of fact, the employer itself is, under Title VII the only proper defendant. Individ-
ual persons cannot be sued under Title VII unless they are the owners of the employing busi-
ness. This is true even if the individuals in question are high-level executives. See. e.g., Pate v.
Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1228 (N.D. Cal. 1979)
(personnel manager not "employer" within the meaning of Title VII and is hence not liable for
unlawful practices).
94 Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 149-52; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 909; Barnes v.
Costle, 516 F.2d at 993.
95 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 905; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d at 943; Katz v. Dole,
709 F.2d at 255-56.
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offer evidence that other women had lodged complaints against her har-
asser in the past and that sufficient remedial action had not been taken.
C. The Admission of Evidence of the Harasser's Conduct
Toward Other Female Employees in the
Hostile Work Environment Cases
Sexual harassment plaintiffs can point to a number of hostile work
environment cases in which courts have admitted evidence relating to the
alleged harasser's conduct toward other female employees. For example,
in Bundy v. Jackson,9 6 the district court admitted evidence that the plain-
tiff's male supervisor had sexually intimidated her female co-workers as
well as herself. And in Morgan v. Hertz Corp. ," the court admitted testi-
mony that the plaintiff's harasser also subjected other female employees
to vulgar and indecent language.
A small but growing number of courts have directly addressed the
relevancy of testimony regarding the alleged harasser's conduct toward
women other than the plaintiff in a hostile work environment case. The
first judicial statement on the admissibility of such testimonial evidence
was made in Caldwell v. Hodgeman,98 an unemployment insurance
appeals case. After acknowledging the validity of a hostile work environ-
ment claim, the Caldwell court stated that "[w]here the environment
becomes relevant, the experience of others becomes relevant." Recently,
the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the issue in greater detail in
Vinson v. Taylor.99
In Vinson, the district court had refused to hear evidence establish-
ing that the alleged harasser had sexually harassed the plaintiff's co-
workers. The court of appeals reversed, holding that evidence tending to
show that the alleged harasser's conduct extended to other women in the
workplace is directly relevant to the question of whether he created a
work environment violating Title VII. " In fact, the court noted that
such evidence may be critical to the establishment of the plaintiff's case,
since a hostile work environment case must be based on more than a
mere showing of "isolated indicia of a discriminatory environment."' 0 '
As the above discussion demonstrates, the inclusion of a cause of
action for the creation of a hostile work environment can serve as a basis
for the relevancy of evidence regarding the alleged harasser's conduct
96 641 F.2d 934, 940 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
97 542 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1981), a.f'd sub nom. Sones-Morgan v. Hertz Corp. 725 F.2d
1070 (1984).
98 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1647 (1981).
99 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1423, revg 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C.
1980).
100 Id. at 1427.
10I Id. (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d at 943 n.9).
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toward female employees other than the plaintiff. This evidence is not
offered to demonstrate that the alleged harasser had a propensity to act
in a certain manner toward the plaintiff. Rather, it is offered to establish
directly one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff'sprimafacie
case.
D. The Job Detriment Theory and Proof of Intent to Discriminate
As discussed above, 02 a sexual harassment plaintiff can establish a
violation of Title VII either by demonstrating that the harasser's conduct
created a hostile work environment or by establishing that her unfavora-
ble reaction to a supervisor's sexual advances resulted in some tangible
job detriment. '03 The inclusion of a job detriment claim in the complaint
will provide an additional basis for the admissibility and hence the dis-
coverability of evidence regarding a harassing supervisor's prior conduct
toward other female employees.
To establish a violation of Title VII under the job detriment theory,
a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by proving that: (1) she is
a member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sex-
ual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; and
(4) her reaction to the harassment affected tangible aspects of her
employment. 'o Once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the
burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the defendant, who
must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
action taken against the plaintiff. Should the defendant carry this bur-
den, the plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the "legitimate non-discriminatory" reason offered
by the defendant was not his true reason, but was instead a pretext for
discrimination. 05
At all times, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving that the
harassing supervisor intentionally discriminated against her because of
her reaction to his unwelcome sexual advances or other conduct of a
sexual nature. Proof of intent to discriminate is an essential element of a
job detriment claim.
While the burden of proving intent may be onerous in some
respects, it also provides the plaintiff with an evidentiary theory which
supports the admissibility of the harassing supervisor's conduct toward
other female employees. Under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
102 See supra text accompanying notes 74-86.
203 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 901-03, 908-09; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d at 943-46.
204 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 909, 911 n.22; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d at 951.
105 Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, 721 F.2d 77, 79-80 (3d Cir.
1983); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d at 953.
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dence, 11 6 evidence of a party's prior "wrongs" or acts is not admissible to
prove that on a particular occasion he acted in conformity with his prior
conduct. However, under the exceptions enumerated in Rule 404(b),
such evidence is admissible to prove intent where intent is an essential
element of a party's claim or defense.' 7 Thus, while Rule 404(b) prohib-
its the admission of evidence of the harasser's prior conduct to show that
he had a propensity to harass the plaintiff sexually, it permits introduc-
tion of the same evidence to prove that the adverse action taken against
her was motivated by a desire to retaliate for her negative response to his
advances.'o 8
Courts have allowed plaintiffs to introduce past acts evidence to
prove intent to discriminate in numerous individual disparate treatment
cases.109 In so doing, many of these courts have noted that discrimina-
tory intent can rarely be proved directly and can often be established
only by the cumulative force of circumstantial evidence. 0 These courts
echo the view expressed in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine,1 1 in which the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of rules
relating to burdens of proof in Title VII disparate treatment cases is
106 See supra note I I for text of Rule 404(b).
107 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 30, at 401[03].
108 For example, in a termination case, the plaintiff may wish to introduce evidence that other
women were fired by her alleged harasser after they refused his advances or responded nega-
tively toward his sexually offensive conduct. If, when asked for an offer of proof, the plaintiff's
attorney states that the evidence is offered to prove that the harasser had a tendency to do this
sort of thing and thus was likely to do it to the plaintiff, Rule 404(b) will prohibit its admis-
sion. However, if the attorney states that the evidence is offered to prove intent to discrimi-
nate, which is an essential element in the plaintiff's claim, Rule 404(b) would sanction its
introduction.
109 Grano v. Department of Dev., 637 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1980) (individual sex discrimination
claimant may introduce evidence of discriminatory treatment of other female employees to
prove intent to discriminate); Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977) (statistical evidence reflecting defendant's past treatment of other
employees is admissible to prove intent to discriminate in individual disparate treatment case);
Blowers v. Lawyers Coop. Pub. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1425 (W.D.N.Y. 1981)
(defendant's prior treatment of female employees relevant to plaintiff's showing of pretext);
Stewart v. Campbell Soup Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 972 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (over
defendant's objection that evidence of its prior treatment of employees and applicants other
than the plaintiff was irrelevant and inadmissible, court held such evidence relevant to prove
intent to discriminate); Department of Fair Housing v. Hubacher Cadillac-Saab, Inc., Cal.
F.E.H.C. Decision No. 81-01 (1981) (in a sexual harassment job detriment case, employer
argued that evidence regarding the harasser's treatment of female employees other than the
plaintiff was inadmissible propensity evidence. Commission rejected this contention and held
evidence admissible to prove intent to discriminate); Brown v. Wood, 575 P.2d 760, 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 88 (Alaska 1978) (an individual employment discrimination plaintiff
must be allowed, as part of her proof of pretext, to furnish evidence not only that the employer
discriminated against her, but also that there exists a pattern of similar discrimination by the
employer).
110 See cases cited supra note 109 and, in particular, Stewart v. Campbell Soup Co., 27 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 973. In Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court
went so far as to state in relation to the admissibility of past acts evidence to prove intent to
discriminate, "victims may find it virtually impossible to prove discriminatory purposes unless
permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant has engaged in one or more acts of dis-
crimination against others."
t 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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"progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of
intentional discrimination." ' 1 2
It is now beyond dispute that proof of intent to discriminate in a
Title VII case may be made through the introduction of statistics which
demonstrate a pattern and practice of discrimination by the defendant
against persons of the plaintiff's race or sex.'" 3 A statistical analysis
compiling the many employment decisions made by a particular defend-
ant is, in actuality, nothing more than an accumulation of numerous
items of past acts evidence. Such statistics survive Rule 404(b) scrutiny
only because they are offered to prove intent, one of the Rule 404(b)
exceptions. The same is true of single items of past acts evidence offered
to prove intent in an employment discrimination case.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the inclusion of a job det-
riment claim in a sexual harassment suit provides the plaintiff with an
evidentiary theory supporting the admissibility of evidence regarding her
alleged harasser's conduct toward other female employees. One caution-
ary note is in order.
For evidence regarding the harasser's prior conduct to be relevant to
the issue of intent to discriminate, the evidence should demonstrate not
only that the supervisor had harassed other female employees, but also
that he had taken some adverse action against them as a result of their
negative reactions to his conduct. This is because the issue of intent
relates to the reasons for the allegedly retaliatory action, i.e., termination,
demotion, lack of promotion, and not to the state of mind accompanying
the harassing conduct itself." 4 Evidence showing harassment without
accompanying retaliatory action would, however, be admissible to
demonstrate the existence of a hostile, offensive and intimidating work
environment.' '5 Thus, in advocating the relevancy of such evidence,
112 Id. at 255 n.8.
113 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
114 There is one decision of the California Fair Employment and Housing Commission, however,
that holds the contrary. In Department of Fair Empl. & Housing v. Hubacher Cadillac-Saab,
Inc., F.E.H.C. Dec. No. 81-01, the Commission, citing CAL. EVID. CODE § I 101(b), admitted
evidence of the alleged harasser's sexually harassing conduct toward other female employees
and female customers without any accompanying showing of adverse actions taken against
them. The Commission stated that such evidence would be probative of the alleged harasser's
intent to discriminate, ie., that his offensive behavior was not inadvertent. A litigant who
attempts to use this holding outside of California, or in a case brought under Title VII may
encounter some difficulty, however. Courts interpreting Title VII have generally held that the
intent of the alleged harasser is irrelevant to the determination as to whether his allegedly
offensive conduct constituted sexual harassment as defined in the EEOC Guidelines. See. e.g.,
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d at 255-56; EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(b) (1985). Rather, this determination is made by applying an objective test which
examines the nature of the conduct itself and the context in which it occurred. The state of
mind of the alleged harasser-or for that matter the alleged harassee-is not considered to be
relevant to this determination. Jennings v. D.H.L. Airlines, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1423, 1425 (N.D. I11. 1984).
115 See supra text accompanying notes 100-102.
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plaintiff's counsel would be well-advised to rely on a hostile work envi-
ronment theory rather than a theory relating to proof of intent.
It is difficult at the commencement of an action to know precisely
what facts will be revealed during the discovery process. For this reason,
and because the admissibility of different types of past acts evidence
depend on different evidentiary theories, the prudent practitioner should
include, whenever appropriate, both a hostile work environment and a
job detriment claim in the complaint. In combination, these two claims
provide a sound basis for the admissibility and hence for the discoverabil-
ity of the alleged harasser's conduct toward female employees other than
the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
The discovery and admission at trial of evidence of either the plain-
tiff's or the alleged harasser's prior sexual conduct are susceptible to
great abuse in sexual harassment litigation. In the coming years, courts
and litigants will be challenged to fashion principles and procedures
which balance the legitimate discovery needs of both parties against the
potential for the oppression and chilling of protected rights that disclo-
sure of the intimate details of people's personal lives can occasion. To
achieve this goal, counsel and the courts must resist the temptations
posed by bias and ideology. The plaintiff's attorney must assist the court
in distinguishing between the improper use of the plaintiff's sexual his-
tory to create prejudice against her, and the proper use of the defendant's
harassment of other employees to prove a tainted work environment or
intent. Each issue that arises must be carefully analyzed by examining
the evidentiary theory that purportedly supports the relevancy of the evi-
dence sought or offered at trial. Additionally, whenever discovery of a
party's sexual history is permitted, fair procedures must be fashioned to
assure that the discovery is taken in a manner which limits the possibili-
ties for abuse.
